The Case for Decentralized Social Identity
The concept of Social Identity is being discussed in the case for decentralized social identity. In Motivating The Case for Decentralized Social Identity: Part One - RadicalxChange, one of the most important functions of an ID system is the ability for individuals to prove their unique human identity to verifiers. This means proving that they are the same person accessing the system through one account over a long period of time and that they only have one account on the system. This ability is referred to as "Sybil resistance" in technical literature. However, there may be a need to escape from the paradigm of 1Person, 1ID ≒ One person, one vote. This is where the philosophy of Phi comes into play. The importance of humanism is highlighted by considering a voting system based on the principle of One person, one vote. In order to maintain the integrity of such a system, it is necessary to ensure that no one votes twice. Even if such a system is superior in other dimensions, if participants can vote multiple times without anyone knowing if they have already voted, the election results will be determined by the preferences of the participants who have the most resources and frequently vote, rather than the majority's will. In many cases, those with the most resources or some form of power can manipulate the system by aggressively seeking votes. This lack of humanism leads to the degradation of democracy into plutocracy. From the perspective of Glen Weyl, the concept of One person, one vote is necessary for democracy, even if it is QV, but it requires an identity layer infrastructure that guarantees 1Person, 1ID. However, it is worth considering alternative consensus formation systems that do not necessarily require 1Person, 1ID. In Motivating The Case For Decentralized Social Identity: Part Three - RadicalxChange, the authors Kaliya Young and Glen Weyl discuss the ambitious potential of social identity. They propose combining the benefits of democratic governance associated with nation-states and the dynamic entrepreneurial spirit associated with capitalism to create a new political-economic infrastructure. One mechanism they propose is Quadratic Finance, which involves government, philanthropists, and other public institutions providing matching funds and individual contributors directing the establishment of public goods providers. The precise calculation formula is mathematically complex, but it involves matching smaller donations more than larger ones and matching donations to popular activities more than those with fewer contributors. Unlike traditional democratic nations, this mechanism is not based on the principle of One person, one vote, but is flexible, driven by emerging demands, and incorporates monetary value. This mechanism seems applicable to decision-making regarding Which public goods should be subsidized by the national treasury?. Therefore, QF provides incentives for citizens (individual agents) to contribute with their own money. However, it may not work effectively in other types of consensus formation. For example, in situations like the one described in 凸型処分と凹型処分, where Policy A has good results, Policy B has tolerable but bad results, and mixing the two halfway is the worst, it is unlikely that consensus can be reached through QF. In such cases, it may be impossible to consider an agreement formation system that does not necessarily require 1Person, 1ID.